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with Diderot, in 1773, did not generate any excitement on either side: Diderot found the 
philosopher far less interesting than the patroness; Hemsterhuis, for his part, thought Diderot 
in person a disappointment, after reading his works. 
I wish I could say that I found Hemsterhuis an exciting thinker, as he is presented in Moen- 
kemeyer's useful and informed study. I cannot. On the other hand, this quiet philosopher 
from Holland stood at one of  the great crossroads in the history of  European thought. In his 
struggle against the Atheism he saw emerging from the French Enlightenment, in his stress on 
essences, known and unknown, as opposed to the atheistic concept of  matter, in his doctrine 
of  total personality rather than faculty psychology, in his idea of  perfectibility and the Golden 
Age that he likened to the afterl ife--in these he had found a way out of  the sterile impass con- 
fronting the disciples of  Diderot and d 'Holbach.  In short, this is a figure of undeniable conse- 
quence historically, and he has been too long ignored by American students of philosophy. 
We should be grateful both to the author and to the publisher for making him known to us in 
this monograph, the first comprehensive study of  Hemsterhuis ever published in English. 
WALTER E. REX 
University of  California, Berkeley 
The Autonomy of  Reason: A Commentary on Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals ."  By Robert Paul Wolff. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Pp. x + 228. $12.50) 
The Autonomy of  Reason reflects Wolff 's  determination to get out of Kant 's  system what is 
good and to get out of  Kant 's  system for good. It thus burns with the conflicting passions of a 
devoted student who has learned much from a reserved teacher but who now finds it impera- 
tive to break with him for precisely the reasons that attracted him initially. This explains why 
much of the book reads like a declaration of  independence yet is based on a sympathetic, even 
immanent, critique of Kant addressed to Wolff  himself. Although he is addressing himself, 
others may share and will certainly benefit from Wolff 's  two decades of  intense study of  Kant. 
Without question Wolff  has written a provocative and important book. Contrary to its title, 
however, it is not really about the autonomy of  reason; and contrary to its subtitle, it is only 
partly a commentary on Kant 's  Groundwork. It serves, rather, as a propaedeutic to Wolff 's 
own moral and political views. I believe this at least accounts for some of  the puzzling features 
of  the book: its highly personal nature, its style of philosophical commentary, and its 
devastating introduction. 
Wolff does not see his task as one of either historical exegesis or philosophical criticism. In 
the place of  both Whiff  proposes a "philosophical reconstruction" of  the text. This is both 
desirable and necessary, he says, because " o f  all the great philosophers, there is none so rich in 
insights and so plagued by inconsistency as Kant"  (p. 4). The resulting reconstruction will be 
worthwhile provided that affirmative answers can be given to two questions: "Does the 
interpretation developed here illuminate the text, so that at least some of what Kant says is 
clearer and more plausible in the light of  it; and, more important still, does the interpretation 
result in an argument whose independent philosophical merit justifies the effort spent 
grappling with Kant?" (p. 5). 
A third question suggests itself: would Kant recognize himself as the author of the 
reconstructed text? This question one must answer in the negative, for the Groundwork that 
emerges, although certainly Kantian, does not accurately reflect Kantianism. To the extent 
that this is a criticism, it is so only because the book advertises itself as a commentary. In 
short, Wolff 's  book is similar to Strawson's Bounds of  Sense in that the value of  both lies in 
salvaging something of  worth from the sunken hulk of Kantianism. 
Wolff 's  Introduction is particularly revealing, for it consists of  a sustained attack on several 
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of Kant's central metaphysical claims, an attack which, if successful, undermines much of his 
ethics. As an introduction to a commentary, it prejudices the outcome; as an introduction to a 
philosophical criticism, however, it merits careful scrutiny. 
According to Wolff, Kant postulates four selves: phenomenal, noumenal, transcendental, 
and moral. This presents the insurmountable problem of determining "the relations among 
the several selves, or functions of the self, which people his theory" (p. 9). Given that Hume 
had difficulty discovering even one self, this is indeed a serious charge. But Kant never over- 
populated his theory: he was a firm believer in one man, one self. One's noumenal self is the 
very same self that presents itself to empirical intuition (phenomenal self), except that as 
noumenal it is considered apart from its relationf to inner sense. Kant is his own best 
spokesman on this poin.t: "I ,  as a being that thinks, am one and the same subject as myself, as 
a being of the sense. However, in so far as I am affected within by sensations of time, whether 
simultaneous or successive, as an object of inner empirical intuition, I have knowledge of 
myself only in the manner in which I am presented to myself, not as a thing in itself" (An- 
thropologie, w 7). 
Wolff further argues that Kant's thoroughly critical philosophy absolutely precludes any 
application of the categories to noumena and thus ruins his attempt to reconcile free will and 
determinism, for resolution of that conflict depends on hypothetically applying the category 
of causality to noumenal action. In destroying his attempted reconciliation Kant necessarily 
undermines the foundations of his entire ethical system. 
Wolff's conclusions may be sound, but not, I think, for the reason given. Kant asserts over 
and over that the categories are applicable to noumena: it is simply that empirical knowledge 
cannot be had of them. Typical of Kant's view is a note at B166 of the Critique of  Pure 
Reason: "for thought the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, 
but have an unlimited field. It is only the knowledge of that which we think, the determining 
of the object, that requires intuition." 
Wolff is perfectly familiar with such passages but ignores them for two closely related 
reasons. First, he maintains that on Kant's thoroughly critical view categories are nothing but 
"rules for the organization of a manifold of sensibility" (p. 7). Although Wolff does not 
argue this point here, he extensively defends it in his Kant's Theory of  Mental Activity, 
especially pages 214-218. While his claim merits careful consideration, it is far from con- 
clusively established. It might be tested, for instance, against the analysis D. P. Dryer offers in 
Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, especially chapters 6 and 11. From a re- 
viewer's standpoint, however, it is disturbing that a devastating charge against Kant 's entire 
ethical theory is drawn from a book not under consideration and is taken as established. 
Wolff is led to such excesses, I think, because of his adherence to the patchwork thesis. In his 
earlier book he states that the patchwork theory, though no doubt bad history, is eminently 
reasonable as a reconstruction of Kant's argument. Adherence to this theory permits Wolff to 
discard anything that does not (apparently) square with what he takes to be Kant's "deeper" 
and more thoroughly critical investigation. It is the philosophy of "as if" with a vengeance! 
Readers of this commentary must therefore be on guard against a Kant that is 
"reconstructed" and sometimes "reconstituted." 
Nowhere is this more evident than in Wolff's discussion of the autonomy of reason itself. 
As the title of his book indicates, Wolff believes that the notion of autonomy provides the key 
to Kant's moral philosophy. And in the following passage, Kant gives what Wolff considers 
"the classic explication of the concept of autonomy" (p. 178): "The will is therefore not mere- 
ly subject to the law, but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for 
itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself 
as the author)" (Groundwork, Ak. 431, second emphasis added by Wolff). The words em- 
phasized, Wolff asserts, "are the heart of the concept of autonomy," and from them "flow 
the most far-reaching consequences for politics as well as for ethics" (p. 178). 
484  H I S T O R Y  O F  P H I L O S O P H Y  
Those  famil iar  with Wol f f ' s  In Defense o f  Anarchism will know tha t  the consequences  are 
far - reaching indeed.  There  he stresses tha t  to be  a u t o n o m o u s  one mus t  be self-legislating, tha t  
is, give laws to oneself.  Since au thor i ty  is the r ight  to c o m m a n d  and,  correlatively,  the right to 
be obeyed,  an  irresolvable confl ict  arises be tween  individual  a u t o n o m y  and  state authori ty .  
Wol f f ' s  const rual  o f  Kant  therefore  leads inexorably to the doctr ine  of  phi losophical  
anarch ism.  
For tunate ly ,  Kant  construes  his words different ly,  as Wol f f  ruefully acknowledges:  " T h e  
a rgument  for  the fo rmula  o f  a u t o n o m y  turns  on  the  not ion  of  legislating disinterestedly, tha t  
is to say, legislating independent ly  of  or in abs t rac t ion  f rom the  par t icular  interests of  the 
a g e n t "  (pp. 178-179). T h o u g h  this is t rue,  there  is even more  to Kan t ' s  no t ion  o f  au tonomy.  
Pe rhaps  the clearest s ta tement  of  his own unde r s t and ing  of  a u t o n o m y  occurs at  the  beginning 
of  Chap te r  3: 
What else then can freedom of will be but autonomy--that  is, the property which will has of being a law 
to itself? The proposition "Will is in all its actions a law to itself" expresses, however, only the principle 
of acting on no maxim other than one which can have for its object itself as at the same time a universal 
law. This is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality. Thus a free 
will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. (Groundwork, Ak. 447) 
A u t o n o m y  is essentially the f reedom o f  reason:  one is free only  when one ' s  actions are 
de te rmined  by the  object ive,  universal izable requi rements  o f  reason.  Because rat ionali ty 
dis t inguishes man  f rom brutes ,  in acting ra t ional ly  one ' s  act ions are free, au tonomous ,  and  
self-determined.  For  Kant ,  there  is no  irresolvable confl ict  between f reedom and  reason or 
between a u t o n o m y  and  author i ty .  For  Wolf f ,  on  the o ther  hand ,  a u t o n o m y  is essentially the 
f reedom f rom reason:  one is free only when  one ' s  act ions are de termined by self-willed 
principles,  principles tha t  in themselves are ne i ther  ra t ional  nor  i r rat ional .  
Wol f f ' s  posi t ion is not  far f rom Hare ' s .  Bo th  hold that ,  in the end,  we simply choose a set 
of  principles tha t  specify a way of  life and  try to live by them. Both  place great  emphasis  on 
free choice, choice unfe t te red  by anyth ing  o ther  than  consistency. Both  arrive at  existential 
Kant ianism,  1 th ink ,  because bo th  are convinced  by Hume  tha t  ends and  subs tant ive  moral  
principles are not  amenable  to ra t ional  evaluat ion.  It is no accident  tha t  bo th  W o l f f  and  Hare 
believe that  f reedom and  reason are difficult  to reconcile. 
Wol f f  is explicit in his denial  o f  any subs tan t ive  mora l  principles tha t  are objectively 
binding.  
1 am persuaded that moral obligations, strictly so-called, arise from freely chosen contractual commit- 
ments between or among rational agents who have entered into some continuing and organized interac- 
tion with one another. Where such contractual commitments do not exist, cannot plausibly be construed 
as having been tacitly entered into, and cannot even be supposed to be the sort that would be entered into 
if the persons were to attempt some collective agreement, then no moral obligations bind one person to 
another. (P. 219) 
There are no substantive principles of action which are objectively binding on all rational agents. 
Substantive obligations can arise only from free acts of commitment by which groups of rational agents 
collectively bind one another to a set of principles of action. (P. 51) 
Wol f f ' s  ph i losophy  of  c o m m i t m e n t  has some strange implicat ions.  Wha t  is it, for  instance, 
tha t  makes  murder  wrong? M u r d e r  is wrong,  we are told,  because " i t  is an ins tance o f  killing 
someone  who  has  not  accepted a practice of  mutua l  hostili ty and  could not  reasonably  be 
expected to accept  it if offered a chance  a c h o o s e "  (p. 51). Kant ,  a long with nearly every other  
m a j o r  mora l  phi losopher ,  would hold tha t  murder  is wrong even if  everyone explicitly 
consented  to live in a society which did not  forb id  the  taking of  lives when  it suited one. Can it 
be true tha t  what  makes  rape,  tor ture ,  and  m u r d e r  wrong is simply tha t  the victim did not  
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consent to suffer or die? Consent, contractual obligations, and free acts of commitment 
certainly have a place in a complete ethical theory. But do they have the only place? 
If Wolff has consigned certain of Kant's central theses to the deep, he also has managed to 
salvage and restore others. In The Right and the Good, for instance, Ross argues that it is 
logically absurd to suppose that we ought to act from a sense of duty. But Wolff argues 
convincingly that "what Kant actually says is that our acts have moral worth only insofar as 
they are done from a certain motive (namely, respect for the law). Their rightness is quite 
independent of their motive. We have, according to Kant, an obligation to do what is right. 
We do not have an obligation to perform morally meritorious acts" (p. 81). Wolff also 
manages to shed light on Kant's analysis of rational agency and the nature of will. He enables 
us to see more clearly than Kant himself does that "will" does not name a faculty but rather 
has a home in such phrases as "to have a will" which, in turn, "simply means to be capable of 
being moved by reason rather than by natural causes . . . .  To be free is simply to be moved by 
reason" (p. 216). 
Despite its flaws as a commentary, The Autonomy of  Reason contributes significantly to 
our understanding of Kant and the problems he addresses. Wolff's critique is especially 
valuable because it attempts to relate Kant's ethics to his metaphysics and epistemology in 
more than a superficial manner. If it does not always succeed, it never ceases to be 
provocative, imaginative, and well-argued. The Autonomy of  Reason offers us a flesh 
opportunity not only to grapple with the central problems of Kantian ethics but to face the 
central issues of contemporary ethics as well. 
HANS OBERDIEK 
Swarthmore College 
Philosophic als System bei Fichte Schelling und Hegel. By Adolf Schurr. (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann, 1974, Pp. 192. DM 58) 
Fichte and Schelling often seem to have existed merely to serve as a bridge between the 
genius of Kant and Hegel. Whether or not they deserve better can here be left unanswered, but 
in any case Schurr's study has supported this common conception. It begins with a "Kant ian"  
Fichte, passes through a confused Schelling, and ends with a young and confident Hegel. 
The particular topic developed by Schurr is the attempts made by Fichte and Schelling to 
forge a unitary system from the brilliant yet fundamentally unresolved conceptions of the 
Kantian legacy. The study was initially prepared as Schurr's Habilitationschrift at Regensburg 
University, and it evidences all of the virtues and vices of these advanced forms of doctoral 
dissertations: it is orderly and firmly documented, virtues that when pressed pass into the vices 
of a deadening style and an uninspired recital of textual references. Perhaps the best single 
term encompassing these virtues and vices is "conscientiousness." The study should arouse 
neither speculative enthusiasm nor scholarly disdain, being principally a direct and uncompli- 
cated exposition of some central principles found in the philosophy of Fichte, the thought of 
young Schelling, and a single text of Hegel. It covers the brief historical period from Fichte's 
review of Schulze's Aenesidemus in 1794 to the appearance of Hegel's 1801 study Differenz 
des Fichteschen und Sehellingsehen Systems der Philosophic. 
The work, then, is naturally divided into three chapters of uneven length. Were the reader 
to rely upon pagination alone to determine importance, Fichte leads by far, and Hegel is the 
least, being granted only nineteen pages. Insofar as each philosopher is confined to his chap- 
ter, the length allowed seems more than usually significant. In this regard, as the final chapter 
on Hegel can hardly be said to touch directly upon Hegel's own conception of a system, the 
title of Schurr's work could be misleading to anyone more closely interested in Hegel. 
